Transactions typically move through six core techniques identified in the study. Although the report did not detail every method, it noted that digital assets allow funds to cross borders quickly, settle in multiple time zones, and evade conventional financial surveillance. Stablecoins such as USDT, issued by Tether, and USDC, issued by Circle, are the preferred instruments because their value is pegged to the U.S. dollar, limiting price swings that could eat into criminal earnings.
Range of illicit clients
Demand for laundering services on the Telegram channels comes from a spectrum of actors, including organized crime syndicates, fraud rings, and entities linked to sanctioned states, according to Andrew Fierman, head of national security intelligence at Chainalysis. Investigators have traced funds tied to North Korean cyberattacks, Southeast Asian human-trafficking schemes, and other prohibited activities passing through the same ecosystems.
Mark Button, a criminology professor at the University of Portsmouth who studies transnational financial crime, told researchers that Telegram has become a common meeting ground for launderers worldwide, from networks operating in West Africa to those embedded in India. He emphasized that the Chinese-language rings are “large, well-resourced organizations,” rather than loosely connected individuals.
Reliance on casinos and other front businesses
The laundering process rarely ends with a direct conversion to fiat currency. Instead, many operators mix tainted funds with revenue from ostensibly legitimate enterprises, particularly casinos, the Chainalysis report said. Button noted that overstating casino income is a long-standing tactic for disguising criminal proceeds: gamblers can claim to have “won” funds that, in reality, originate from off-chain wallets.
Southeast Asia has emerged as a hotspot for both licensed and unlicensed gambling venues linked to criminal syndicates. A 2024 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime assessment described a proliferation of casino complexes in Cambodia, Myanmar, and neighboring states that double as nodes for money laundering, online fraud, and forced-labor scam operations. Chainalysis analysts observed substantial overlap between wallets associated with those casinos and addresses tied to CMLNs.
Regulatory landscape and relocation trends
China outlawed domestic cryptocurrency trading in 2021 and maintains stringent anti-money-laundering statutes. Those restrictions have pushed a portion of Chinese criminal activity offshore, Chainalysis said, as syndicates migrate to jurisdictions perceived as having weaker enforcement and potentially corruptible local officials. Cambodia and Myanmar, where large scam centers have been uncovered in recent years, are frequent destinations.
Despite relocation, the language of coordination remains Mandarin, allowing groups to tap a common pool of brokers, money mules, and technical specialists. The platforms’ semi-public nature on Telegram makes them accessible but also adaptable; once a channel is exposed, administrators typically reappear under a different name or move to a private invite-only forum, investigators told Chainalysis.
Technology choices and financial logic
Launderers favor stablecoins because they limit exposure to market volatility. Fierman pointed out that criminals already pay fees to brokers—often a single-digit percentage of the amount moved—and are unwilling to absorb additional losses from price swings in assets such as bitcoin or ether. Stablecoins, which aim to track the dollar on a one-to-one basis, reduce that risk and can be swapped for local currencies or other crypto assets when needed.
The report observed that transactions routinely hop between multiple blockchains and centralized exchanges before reaching a final wallet, a process intended to fragment the trail and frustrate forensic analysis. Some laundering desks also employ over-the-counter (OTC) brokers who hold accounts at several exchanges, further complicating efforts to freeze assets.
Enforcement actions and ongoing challenges
Law enforcement agencies in the region have begun to target these networks, but the complexity of cross-border operations poses ongoing hurdles. China state media said last Thursday that courts executed eleven members of a Myanmar-based fraud syndicate on charges ranging from intentional homicide to illegal casino operation, underlining Beijing’s stance against organized crime. Nevertheless, Chainalysis and external academics caution that the broader ecosystem is resilient.
According to Fierman, illicit actors tend to “evolve rapidly.” When one payment corridor is blocked—whether by exchange shutdowns, blockchain tracing, or arrests—networks shift to alternative coins, new platforms, or fresh jurisdictions. The cycle creates a persistent game of catch-up for regulators and investigators.
The findings place renewed attention on the intersection of cryptocurrency, messaging apps, and transnational crime. While technological transparency on public blockchains offers investigators new data points, the speed and creativity of laundering professionals continue to test conventional policing models. Chainalysis concluded that Chinese-language money laundering networks remain a significant force in the illicit-crypto economy and are likely to adapt further in 2026.
Crédito da imagem: Anadolu Agency / Getty Images
